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Harmful and dangerous language is frequent in social media, in particular in spaces which 
are considered anonymous and/or allow free participation. In this paper, we analyse the 
language in a Telegram channel populated by followers of Donald Trump, in order to 
identify the ways in which harmful language is used to create a specific narrative in a 
group of mostly like-minded discussants. Our research has several aims. First, we create 
an extended taxonomy of potentially harmful language that includes not only hate speech 
and direct insults, but also more indirect ways of poisoning online discourse, such as 
divisive speech and the glorification of violence. We apply this taxonomy to a large 
portion of the corpus. Our data gives empirical evidence for harmful speech such as 
in/out-group divisive language and the use of codes within certain communities which 
have not often been investigated before. Second, we compare our manual annotations to 
several automatic methods of classifying hate speech and offensive language, namely list 
based and machine learning based approaches. We find that the Telegram data set still 
poses particular challenges for these automatic methods. Finally, we argue for the value 
of studying such naturally occurring, coherent data sets for research on online harm and 





Digital media can cause harm in different ways. In addition to language that directly 
causes harm, such as bullying, hate speech attacks, and trolling, there are many more 
implicit avenues for online harm. These can include the spread of disinformation and the 
use of dehumanising, offensive, and incendiary language. Such language causes harm 
even when not directed at or read by individuals of target groups. It does so by poisoning 
public discourse, facilitating a networking platform for individuals with extreme views 
and thus creating a climate for normalising harmful practices with consequences beyond 
the online forums where they are primarily trafficked (Popa-Wyatt, forth.).  
In this paper, we analyse a public channel from the direct messaging platform 
Telegram, which is rife with such indirect forms of offensive language. The channel is a 
platform where right-wing views are exchanged among like-minded people, expressing 
harmful views both explicitly and implicitly. Our data shows how extreme online 
discussions may lead to extreme actions, as the users of this channel gradually went from 
discussing governmental overthrow as a theoretical possibility to planning the January 6, 
2021, Capitol riot by sharing information on hotels and transportation in Washington, 
DC, and to finally discussing the aftermath of the event. We argue that the use of harmful 
language on this channel can serve to enable the feeling of group membership and thus 
facilitate the incitement of violent actions. 
Our paper makes the following contributions: First, we apply several automatic 
annotations of hate speech and offensive language to our data, chronicling the prevalence 
of hateful language in this Telegram corpus. Second, we define a taxonomy of harmful 
expressions in online discussions which includes both direct and indirect forms. Third, 
we manually annotate a subset of the corpus with our taxonomy. Finally, we evaluate the 
currently available automatic methods of hate speech detection by comparing them with 
our manual annotations, giving pointers for future work.1 
 
 
1 For illustration of our taxonomy and in order to understand the nature of the platform channel we are 
analysing, this paper contains examples of harmful language. We cite these examples as sparingly as 
possible, and all are attested in the corpus. 
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(2) Online harm and social media 
Online hate has become a central research focus in several fields, including 
computational linguistics, social and political philosophy, communication science, as 
well as in discussions about policy and regulation in the context of free speech debates 
(Brison & Gelber, 2019). One approach to analysing hate speech is by studying text 
corpora containing such language; either general corpora from websites, online forums 
or social media, or specific corpora collected around an event of interest (such as 
discussions of the European refugee crisis in 2015, which triggered large amounts of 
xenophobic and racist hate speech on the internet). The public repository hatespeechdata2 
has already collected several dozen text corpora with hate speech in different languages 
(Vidgen & Derczynski, 2020). 
We see two challenges with the existing datasets: (i) diversity of topics, platforms, 
and collection methods; and (ii) a lack of agreement of what constitutes “hate speech”. 
We aim to address both in this contribution. As to (i), most existing corpora of hate speech 
were collected opportunistically from easily accessible media, mainly Twitter. For 
practical reasons, many datasets further are restricted to certain specific domains (sexism, 
anti-immigrant rhetoric). Finally, many corpora and annotations concentrate on quite 
overt forms of hate speech and offensive language. In contrast, we are interested in 
studying how even very indirect forms of harmful language in an online community can 
influence members’ thinking and over time lead to concrete harms in society. In this 
paper, we are trying to establish an empirical basis for such implicit expressions of online 
harm in the context of supporters of former US president Donald Trump.  
Challenge (ii) is the lack of a common definition of “hate speech”, which is reflected 
in the various uses of terms such as “dangerous speech”, “offensive language”, 
“assaultive language”, “poisonous language”, “discriminatory verbal harassment”, 
“incitement”, etc. (Matsuda et al., 1993;  Haraszti, 2012; Benesch et al., 2018; Brison & 
Gelber, 2019). Here we shall adopt a broader umbrella term of ‘online harm’. Secondly, 
not all datasets provide clear definitions for what kind of language is considered offensive 
(Vidgen & Derczynski, 2020), and where definitions are provided, they often contradict 
each other. Here, we aim to give a taxonomy of the language of online harm as applies to 
our type of online (in-group) discussion. 
 




Telegram is an encrypted mobile messaging platform which is popular as an 
alternative to less secure messengers such as What’sApp in person-to-person 
communication. In addition, it offers private and public “channels” for one-to-many 
interactions. These channels can be created by any user and are often employed to share 
information or news; but they also serve as discussion forums by allowing responses. Due 
to the encryption features, Telegram has been used by extremist groups to spread their 
ideology and recruit users (Prucha, 2016; Yayla & Speckhardt, 2017; Shehabat, Mitew, 
& Alzoubi, 2017). As an additional feature to protect users, many channels regularly 
delete all posted content (for example, performing daily purges) to make them unavailable 
(Baumgartner et al., 2020). Baumgartner et al. (2020) provide a large snapshot of raw 
data from public channels on Telegram, collected by bootstrapping from a seed list of 
channels. However, they do not specifically analyse the language included in this large 
sample. We are not aware of any previous Telegram corpora addressing offensive 
language or online harm. Following the recommendations by Vigden & Derczynski 
(2020), we create a new dataset from a Telegram channel for which we expect that it 
contains a significant amount of harmful and dangerous language. In the following 
subsection, we introduce our working definition and taxonomy for analysis. 
(2.2) Online harm and hate speech  
“Hate speech” and “dangerous speech” are two key terms in the legal context of 
regulating discrimination. This is particularly important when it comes to regulating 
online content. There are two challenges to this project. One is a definitional problem: we 
lack a univocal definition of what forms of speech count as hate/dangerous speech 
(Brown, 2017; Benesch et al., 2918; Gelber, 2019), which is to serve as a guiding policy 
for detection of online harmful content. The other challenge is a legal problem of 
establishing under what conditions the harm achieved is subject to legal protection 
(Bleich, 2011; Waldron, 2014; Oster, 2015; Heinze, 2016; Howard 2019). Here we focus 
on the first problem, though our goal is not to settle a definition of hate/dangerous speech. 
Our goal is more modest: we shall provide a classification of various forms of 
hate/dangerous speech and illustrate them empirically with a corpus from a Telegram 
channel. The qualitative and quantitative analysis we provide below will help towards 
developing and improving tools for automatic detection of online harm.  
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It is difficult to define and circumscribe hate/dangerous speech because it includes a 
host of heterogeneous phenomena that share a certain number of common features. We 
follow Brown (2017) in taking hate speech to function more like a “family resemblance” 
rather than unified by a single essential feature common to all discursive phenomena 
typically labelled as hate speech. Among these features, we discern five: 
(1) Hate speech disproportionately harms vulnerable target groups, e.g. (historically) 
oppressed, disadvantaged, marginalised, victimised members of society and groups of 
persons identified by certain characteristics that make them vulnerable and thus in need 
of protection (e.g. based on race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender identity or 
disability, etc.). It does so by facilitating and perpetuating acts of subordination and 
oppression (Matsuda et al., 1993, Langton, 2012; Maitra, 2012; McGowan, 2019; Popa-
Wyatt & Wyatt, 2018). 
(2) Hate speech incites to violence and hatred, serves to provoke, stir up hatred, 
harass, threaten and advocate discrimination, vilify, intimidate, defame, and acts that 
serve to justify and glorify violence against target groups. This often correlates with hate 
crimes (see the category of “fighting words” which is legally protected in the US) 
(Matsuda et al., 1993; Tirrell, 2012; Oster, 2015).  
(3) Hate speech recruits, encourages and enables by-standers, e.g. in the form of racist 
propaganda espousing the inferiority of certain races, which also may lead to promoting 
racial discrimination, hatred, violence, and persecution (Langton, 2012; Tirrell, 2012; 
Stanley, 2015). 
(4) Hate speech is socially divisive and destructive of social cohesion in diverse 
societies, thus reinforcing in-group vs. out-group views. This may be seen to (likely to) 
cause a breach of peace, leading to conflict or even genocide (Brown, 2017; Tirrell, 2012) 
(5) Hate speech undermines people’s reputation and assurance that they are members 
of society in good standing and who deserve to be treated as equal citizens (Waldron, 
2014). 
The difficulty with operationalising the category of hate/dangerous speech is that 
various forms of speech may fall into more than one of the types above. So it will be a 
matter of context which functions are performed at any one time. Recent efforts of finding 
a consensual definition of hate speech come from the Council of Europe. In the context 
of hate speech disseminated through the media, the European Commission against 
Racism and Intolerance has updated an internationally adopted definition: 
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 “Hate speech entails the advocacy, promotion or incitement to denigration, hatred or 
vilification of a person or group of persons, as well as any harassment, insult, negative 
stereotyping, stigmatization or threat to such persons on the basis of a non-exhaustive list 
of personal characteristics or status that includes race, colour, language, religion or belief, 
nationality or national or ethnic origin, as well as descent, age, disability, sex, gender, 
gender identity and sexual orientation.” (ECRI, 2016) 
Clearly, the list of harms and wrongs caused by hate/dangerous speech is much wider 
than the features included in the above definition. We could add to this acts of 
disempowering, marginalising, silencing, insulting, disparaging, degrading, humiliating, 
disheartening, harassing, persecuting, threatening, provoking, inciting hatred, 
discrimination, violence, misrecognising, etc. Also, offensive acts of expressing 
(awakening) emotions and attitudes such as hate, contempt, dislike, disgust, despisement, 
aversion, loathing, antipathy, enmity, hostility, etc. may play a role in spilling over into 
acts of discrimination or violence. Note also acts of putting down, ranking targets as 
inferior, outcast and unwelcome. These might range as offensive and insulting acts rather 
than the more restricted category of hate/dangerous speech. Though clearly not 
everything that is offensive counts as hate/dangerous speech, it’s important to keep these 
in mind because they all together contribute to poisoning the discourse in various 
communities, and further legitimate discriminatory speech and conduct. When anchored 
in a discourse of power, dominance and control, and incubated in like-minded 
communities particularly as in online echo-chambers, this may be the imperceptible 
beginning that leads from speech to action.  
We are interested in describing and classifying the varied forms of expression used to 
cause harm as outlined above (see Jeshion, 2021, for a recent taxonomy of pejoratives). 
In working with the data in our corpus, we have identified the following 5 major 
categories of such expressions. The full taxonomy, including subcategories, is listed in 
Table 1. 
Category I includes expressions of extreme or dangerous speech, assaultive speech, 
and language which glorifies or incites violence (“just burn in the sun”, “DEATH TO 
CHINA”). 
Category II is used for pejorative expressions. These are words or phrases that are 
inherently insulting, derogative, etc. All of these forms are primarily evaluative in that 
they serve to express a speaker’s feelings or attitudes towards the target. Subtypes include 
different types of slurs, which are meant to harm individuals simply because of their 
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group membership, pejoratives (e.g., “scum”, “idiots”), expletives (e.g., “damn”), swear 
words (e.g., “fuck”, “shit”), and others. 
In contrast, category III is reserved for expressions that are being used derogatively, 
but are not inherently pejorative in their conventional meaning. This category includes 
jokes and inventive uses of language meant to put down other individuals (“DemoRATS”, 
“Commiefornia”), insulting metaphors (“they are a sickness”), as well as non-pejorative 
words when used pejoratively in context (e.g., “commie”, “Jews”).  
Category IV is used for expressions which cause harm more implicitly by “othering” 
(Culpeper, 1996; Palmer et al., 2020) another group and covers general divisive language 
creating distinctions between an in- and an out-group (“The Chinese”, “Are women 
banned from this chat? If not, why the fuck not?”).  
Finally, category V is used for coded expressions that can harm the discourse by 
communicating different messages to a like-minded in-group who is able to decode the 
expression than to others (“Trump train”, “GIVE THAT MAN A BRICK”). Notably, this 
category includes dog whistles which may seem innocuous to outsiders (“Patriot”).  
Table 1: Taxonomy of online harm used in manual annotation. 
I. incendiary speech (assaultive speech, extreme speech, dangerous speech, the 
glorification of violence) 
II. pejorative words and expressions 
- dehumanising 
- canonical slurs 
- descriptive slurs 
- gendered slurs and expressions 
- pejorative nicknames 
- stereotyping expressions 
- pejorative words used pejoratively 
- expletives 
- swear words 
- generic pejoratives 
III. insulting / abusive / offensive uses 
- jokes 
- rhetorical questions 
- insulting metaphors 
- inventive 
- non-pejorative words used pejoratively 
IV. in/out-group (divisive speech) 
V. codes 





(3) Methods and data 
For our study, we created a new corpus from one Telegram channel used by 
supporters of former US President Donald Trump Jr., which covers the period from 
December 11, 2016, to January 18, 2021 (Solopova, Scheffler, & Popa-Wyatt, 2021). 
After removing empty messages, the dataset consists of 26,431 messages, produced by 
521 distinct users.  
(3.1) Messages and user activity 
We start our analysis by providing surface statistics on the vocabulary composing the 
dataset. We measured the average length of the message in tokens and characters (12.65 
and 76.11, respectively). This means that Telegram messages are on average comparable 
to tweets, given that tweets average 11-14 tokens and 70-84 characters each (Boot et al., 
2019).  
Reflecting Telegram’s status as a news sharing platform, we note a number of 
messages containing links (454), many of whom consist of only the link without any other 
textual content (333). Similarly to Twitter, Telegram allows user referencing with the 
help of the ‘@’ sign (699), but these mentions for the most part appear in reposted tweets 
and are not used much for communication among the channel participants, probably due 
to the higher level of anonymity this social network provides3. However, @ is used more 
frequently than hashtags (only 209), which are an integral part of Twitter. 
As we can observe in Table 3, the number of messages is not homogeneous 
throughout the 4.5 years. Although this data set only covers 18 days of 2021, this is the 
most active period, recording 15,603 messages. This sudden spike in new users on 
Telegram supports the idea of a migrating effect, following the temporary closure of 
Parler, the ban on Reddit’s r/The_Donald, and the introduction of new Discord policies. 
We can observe this trend in Figure 1, where 2021 records the highest number of new 
users, and also the highest number of old users being ‘revived’ and maintaining their 
activity. It is difficult to assess the activity during 2016 and 2018, first because we only 
cover December of 2016 following the creation of the channel. The second reason is that 
 
3 In contrast, over 20% of tweets are replies in some Twitter corpora (Scheffler, 2014).  
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the channel saw massive message deletion in 2018, which is reflected in a small number 
of overall messages posted that year and also no new users being added to the channel in 
2018 (Figure 1). However, we observe interesting trends in 2019 and 2020. In particular, 
2019 is more active in the number of messages, but less so in the number of users added 
(see Figure 1). This can be explained by the fact that 2019 was full of events worth 
discussing, such as the US government shutdown and state of national emergency being 
introduced in order to secure sufficient funds for the Southern border construction. During 
2020, we can see a gradual increase in activity up to 2021 (see Figure 2), which is mainly 
concerned with the pandemic, though this is not a general topic of interest for this group.  
In 2020, we see the highest activity on December 23 in relation to Donald Trump 
issuing a flurry of pardons and commutations, and also tweeting about the “stolen 
election”: “This was the most corrupt election in the history of our Country, and it must 
be closely examined!” — Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump). Interestingly, during 
this period there is first evidence of planning an assembly on January 6, 2021. The activity 
on the 27th of June 2019 is associated with the r/The_Donald subreddit being quarantined 
by Reddit admins due to excessive reports and threatening of the public figures in the 
context of the 2019 Oregon Senate Republican walkouts. The subreddit also lost revenue 
opportunities and was removed from feeds and search, leading to outrage from its users. 
The most active days in 2018, 2017 and 2016 seem to be reactions to other provocative 
tweets posted by the @realDonaldTrump account. 
January 9, 2021, is the day with the highest number of messages overall (3,696), 
which reflects discussions in the aftermath of January 6, the Capitol Hill insurrection. 
Figure 3 shows that this activity starts on January 7, gradually grows to the 9th and then 
decreases to its usual average on the 16th. 
Table 2. Annual message statistics 
 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 
Number of 
messages 410 2601 1456 5865 4059 15,603 
Max. daily 
messages 75 49 22 449 663 3,696 
Most active 





Figure 1. User statistics per year: newly added users and users active the previous year. 
 




Figure 3. Messages per day in 2021. 
 
(3.2) Offensive language over time 
As described in (Solopova, Scheffler, & Popa-Wyatt, 2021), we automatically 
annotated the entire corpus by surface matching to the offensive language lists by Anger 
(2017) and Shutterstock (2020), and also by applying the open-source automated hate-
speech/offensive language detection library HateSonar (Nakayama, 2017). We then 
measured the attributed tags quantitatively for each year. Interestingly, the messages 
labelled by the slur lists and by the automatic hate speech detection method are 
completely distinct; i.e., no message was tagged both using the offensive word 
dictionaries and by the machine learning based method. In parallel with the 
aforementioned trend on user activity in 2019, 2020, and especially 2021, we can see an 
increase in offensive language (Figure 4), although the overall fraction of these kinds of 
speech stays the same for all three years, at around 17% of messages. We can also see 
that we captured more messages using list matching than using the automated classifier. 
For the automated tool, the offensive tag is attributed almost 3 times more frequently than 
the hate speech category, because hate speech indicates a higher level of intensity of 
“offensiveness” (Davidson et al., 2017). We also have to note that the tool was trained on 
Twitter data, which, as we have seen above, differs in many ways from Telegram 




Figure 4. Automatically predicted offensive language labels over time. White numbers 
show the fraction of the ‘neither’ tag. 
 
(3.3) Manual annotation 
One of the authors manually annotated about one fifth of the data according to the 
taxonomy established in Section (2.2). We chose the time period from November 1, 2020 
to January 7, 2021, to cover the time from the US election up to and including the January 
6 Capitol riot. We added part of January 9, to represent the most active day of our corpus. 
This resulted in 4,505 messages to annotate. We chose Brat (Stenetorp et al., 2012), which 
also permitted us to annotate token-level instances and not only on the sentence level.  
In order to validate the annotation schema and determine the difficulty of the task, we 
chose a continuous thread of 711 messages from January 9, 2021, the most active day, to 
be reannotated by another linguist. This second annotator was provided with the 
taxonomy and examples for the individual categories. After annotation of 200 instances, 
we discussed the taxonomy and several difficult cases with both annotators, before the 
reannotation was completed. We computed inter-annotator agreement between the two 
independent annotations on a message level, first on the binary decision task (= “Should 
the message be flagged as containing harmful language?”), and then taking our 5 top-
level categories into account. The annotators show substantial agreement (Cohen’s 
κ=0.70) on the binary harmful/neutral distinction. When evaluating the 6-way 
classification, we counted any overlap in categories of harmful language between the two 
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annotators as agreement (i.e., if one annotator found only category II, pejoratives, while 
the other found both II and III, we counted the message as an agreement between 
annotators). The fine grained distinction leads to overall lower agreement (κ=0.65), 
reflecting the difficulty of the task. We find these scores promising for such a difficult 
and potentially subjective task and believe that more comprehensive annotation 
guidelines and in particular a dedicated adjudication process between annotators will be 
able to further raise the inter-annotator stability of our taxonomy categories. We leave 
this, as well as a fine-grained token-level agreement evaluation, for future work. 
(4) Results and discussion 
Overall, out of the chosen 4,505 messages we manually identified harmful language 
in 787 messages and 831 instances, meaning that 44 messages had more than one tag 
associated with it. ‘II. Pejorative words and expressions’ is the most represented category 
with 273 messages. The second-largest category is ‘V. code words’ (261). ‘III. 
Insulting/offensive/abusive uses’ and ‘I. incendiary speech’ are similar in size with 115 
and 98 messages, respectively. The least represented class, ‘IV. in/out-group’ (40), is also 
the most complicated by definition and can often coincide with other classes. The 
distribution is shown in Table 3. As for the instance level, there are 310 (37 instances are 
found more than once in one message) instances annotated as ‘pejorative words and 
expressions’ and 121 (only six times in the same message) annotated as 
‘insulting/offensive/abusive uses’, while statistics on the other categories coincide with 
those on the message level. 
Table 3. Statistics on 5 main categories: incendiary speech, pejorative words and 
expressions, insulting/offensive/abusive uses, in/out-group, code words. 






group V. codes All 
Number of 
messages 98 273 115 40 261 787 
Fraction  12% 35% 15% 5% 33% 100% 
 
Looking closely at the sub-categories in Figure 5, we can also observe that they are 
not evenly distributed. Let us start with pejoratives, as the biggest category, with its most 
frequent sub-categories being pejorative words used pejoratively (85 messages, 88 
instances) and pejorative nicknames (90 messages, 97 instances), while swear words in 
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an offensive context account for 56 messages and 60 instances. There are also 27 
canonical slurs, 12 generic pejoratives, 9 descriptive slurs, and only 6 gendered slurs and 
expressions, as well as stereotyping expressions and 2 expletives, while we found no 
examples of dehumanising speech in the manually annotated subcorpus. Within 
‘insulting/offensive/abusive uses’ we found that the largest categories are non-pejorative 
words used pejoratively (39) and insulting metaphors (38). There are also 21 offensive 
jokes, 21 inventive-creative offensive instances, and 6 rhetorical questions.  
 
Figure 5. Sub-category statistics for pejorative words and expression and 
insulting/offensive/abusive uses categories. 
(4.1) Comparison of manual and automated annotations  
We performed a binary and multi-class comparison of the manual and automated 
annotations. The binary comparison (see Figure 6) shows how many potentially harmful 
messages (annotated manually) are also identified by either word list based or machine 
learning based automated methods. Out of the 4,505 messages in the doubly annotated 
subcorpus, 3,395 are tagged neither by the manual annotation nor by the automated one 
(true negatives), while only 275 were correctly found by the automated systems as either 
offensive or hate speech (true positives). Consequently, we have 835 messages annotated 
differently, where the HateSonar classifier or offensive word lists falsely attributed some 
messages as offensive/hate speech (432 false positives) or did not find a manually 
identified harmful message offensive (403 false negatives). Using these numbers, we 
calculated the balanced F-measure for the binary classification for the joined 
 
 15 
list+HateSonar performance as 40% (with 39% precision and 41% recall). These low 
scores confirm the low generalizability of solutions for offensive language detection 
when switching to a new dataset (Yin & Zubiaga, 2021), an effect exacerbated by the fact 
that our data originates from a different platform than the training data and contains many 
different types of more complex and implicit harmful language.  
 
Figure 6. Binary confusion matrix for manual and automated annotation. 
The results demonstrate a need for additional corpora of harmful language and in 
particular for more diverse and fine-grained annotations, as the multi-class confusion 
matrix shows (Table 4). Considering the main categories of harmful language, we note 
that the slur lists overall captured more harmful messages, and mostly overlap with 
category II, pejorative words and expressions. However, list-based detection also flagged 
many neutral messages as harmful (317), indicating low precision. At the same time, the 
machine learning-based system HateSonar has a low recall in our data while in particular 
its hate speech tag exhibits better precision. Overall we can see that the automated tools 
are generally better at finding neutral messages, an effect caused by the prevalence of this 
category in the data. 
On the other hand, we can study our taxonomy using the automatically assigned tags 
as comparison. We see that recall is much higher across the automatic methods (again, 
the automatic tags do not overlap in any messages) for our categories II, III, and IV - 
pejorative expressions, offensive uses of not exclusively derogatory words, and in/out-
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group divisive speech. Incendiary language calling to violence as well as, particularly, 
veiled codes are in contrast harder to detect by current automatic methods.  
Table 4. Confusion matrix of multi-class annotation. 
manual \ auto slur lists hate speech offensive neither recall 
I incendiary 29 0 8 61 0.378 
II pejorative 85 13 30 89 0.590 
III offensive uses 44 3 10 54 0.514 
IV in-/out-group 12 5 4 18 0.538 
V codes 24 0 8 181 0.150 
neither 317 11 104 3395 0.887 
precision 0.380 0.656 0.366 0.894  
 
(4.2) Exploratory analyses 
Drawing on the hypothesis that harmful language poisons online discourse by further 
normalising hate speech, we expect that messages will be prone to contain more offensive 
language when they respond to already offending messages. We found that 24,629 
message-response pairs, which is 93% of all messages, are both neutral. There are also 
836 (3%) neutral responses to offensive messages, 585 (2.2%) offensive responses to a 
neutral message, and only 327 (1.2%) are both offensive. This means that while neutral 
messages receive an offensive response in about 2.3% of cases, this chance increases in 
offensive messages by more than a factor of 10, to 28.1%. Due to the large number of 
messages, this is a highly significant result with a moderate effect size (ꭓ2=2208.64, 
Cramér’s V=0.28). However, as noted above, the automated detection methods for 
offensive language have low accuracy, so this research shall be repeated after a revision 
of the automated tags in order to confirm the results. 
We also explored the idea of Trump’s narrative being reflected in his supporters’ 
language. We analysed quantitative and semantic similarities between our Telegram 
corpus and the Trump Twitter Archive (Brown, 2016), containing all tweets posted by 
Donald Trump since 2016. However, we only found a negative correlation (Spearman’s 
ρ=-0.098) for overall activity, thus our expectation that more tweets would lead to more 
Telegram messages was not confirmed. At the same time, we think that this measurement 
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is inherently difficult as, on the one hand, the discussion can follow tweets with at least a 
day delay, as shown in the case of 27 June 2019, discussing the r/The_Donald ban of June 
26, and on the activity of January 7-9, discussing the Capitol riot on the 6th. On the other 
hand, some days are lacking channel activity completely, so our data set does not always 
have the next day’s data to measure this kind of delayed response.  
We also started analysing the semantic similarity of our corpus and Trump’s tweets 
using contextual embeddings (word2vec, Mikolov, et al., 2013; and Fasttext, Bojanowski, 
et al., 2016). We compared semantically similar words for keywords of Republican 
narrative (“guns”, “China”, “immigrants”, etc) for a vector model trained on Trump 
tweets and another on our Telegram corpus. We only found a semantic similarity for 
“Antifa”, “socialist”, “communist”, and “masks”. The latter is qualified by both as 
“illegal” and “leftists”. The first three are related to “funded” and “criminal”, with 
interchangeable usage of all three and also in strong relation to the Democratic party. We 
believe that building on this preliminary method will allow us to measure how message 
embedding vectors annotated according to our taxonomy differ from the neutral 
vocabulary. 
(5) Summary 
We presented a new corpus of a channel of the instant messaging platform Telegram, 
selected for its large potential for harmful language. The corpus consists of over 25,000 
messages spanning a period of over 4 years and including discussion leading up to and in 
particular following the January 6, 2021, US Capitol riot. We argued for a broad notion 
of harmful language online, which includes not only direct attacks on persons and 
pejorative expressions, but also divisive language and statements meant to poison public 
discourse. To this end, we introduced a broad taxonomy of this type of online harm and 
provide manual annotations on a subset of our corpus. Comparing these annotations with 
automatically obtained labels of hate speech and offensive language, we showed that both 
lexicon-based methods and machine learning algorithms trained on other datasets and 
platforms are unable to detect the various subtle and implicit types of harmful language 
we encounter in our Telegram channel. We therefore believe, along with other authors, 
that much more research is needed in the philosophical foundations of online harm and 
their possible linguistic expressions. We attempt to contribute to this research by 
diversifying the available empirical foundation for these types of investigations in terms 
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of the platform, content, and the kinds of annotations we cover. In contrast to previous 
work, which often focussed on personal derogation, we specifically distinguish between 
pejoratives, which conventionally denote offensive attitudes, and offensive or derogatory 
uses, where non-pejorative expressions are used to attack or put down a person or group. 
These uses, as well as group-internal codes (which are not intended to be addressed to or 
understood by outsiders) and divisive language focussing in in-/out-group distinctions, 
can not easily be identified with lexical items and thus pose additional challenges for 
detection. Finally, the inclusion of language glorifying or inciting violence is important 
in our opinion, as we argue that such speech can lead to corresponding action, but cannot 
itself be easily identified by list based or state of the art machine learning based means. 
We invite researchers from related fields to use our data to further address the question 
of what constitutes online harm, how to detect it, and how to mitigate it. 
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